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V. 
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) 
____________ ) 
NO. 39989 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2011 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Gerald Rhoads requests that the Idaho Supreme Court grant review in 
this matter, which relates to the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Rhoads, 
Docket Number 39989, Opinion No. 388 (Ct. App. February 21, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of Conviction, was 
in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court because the Court of Appeals failed to properly consider the 
harmfulness of the statement in light of the facts of Mr. Rhoads' case. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On the evening of April 10, 2011, Ada County Dispatch received a 911 call 
reporting that a vehicle had slid off Bogus Basin Road in Ada County around mile post 
7. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Deputy Shannon Miller 
arrived at the scene and observed two individuals, a man and a woman, who had been 
in a one-car accident. (Trial Tr., p.245, L.1, p.247, Ls.11-24.) The car was badly 
damaged1 and on the edge of a cliff midway up Bogus Basin Road. (Trial Tr., p.246, 
Ls.9-15, p.247, Ls.14-20.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were muddy and dressed 
inappropriately for the cold April weather. (Trial Tr., p.245, 1-23, p.247, Ls.10-11, 
p.259, L 13 - p.260, L.1.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads appeared intoxicated and 
Mr. Rhoads was not wearing shoes. (Trial Tr., p.245, L.23, p.259, Ls.5-15, p.315, Ls.3-
5.) The two individuals told the officers accident scene a man named "Jeff' 
had been driving, but he ran away after he wrecked the car. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.1-3, 
p.253, Ls.8-18, p.260, Ls.17-25; PSI, p.2.) The car belonged to Sherry Kreisher, 
Ms. Holland's girlfriend at the time. (Trial Tr., p.117, L.25 - p.118, L.3, p.139, L.24 -
p.140, L.1, p.169, L.24-p.170, L.4.) 
Earlier that day, Ms. Kreisher had driven Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads to the 
grocery store and bought a gallon of wine. (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.6-20, p.142, Ls.18-19.) 
Ms. Kreisher then drove them back to her apartment, where the three proceeded to 
drink the wine together.2 (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.21-22, p.141, Ls.11-25.) Ms. Kreisher and 
1 Damage to the car included barbed wire scratches, mud, and a large crack in the top 
corner of the windshield on the passenger's side. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.18-20, p.247, 
Ls.19-24.) 
2 Ms. Holland was only 20 years old at the time, and was arrested that night for illegal 
consumption. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.23-p.200, L.6, p.320, Ls.17-19.) 
2 
Ms. Holland laid down on the couch to watch a movie, and Mr. Rhoads left the 
apartment for a period of time. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.9-10, p.122, L.20 - p.123, L.5.) A 
short time after Mr. Rhoads returned to the apartment, Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads 
grabbed the bottle of wine and went out the front door, presumably towards the patio. 
(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.5-8.) It was some time later that Ms. Kreisher realized that her car 
was missing. (Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.17-25.) The keys had been on her purse, in the 
bedroom she had shared with Ms. Holland. (Trial Tr., p.126, Ls.18-23, p.140, Ls.5-7, 
p.194, L.25 p.195, L.6.) Ms. Kreisher did not see either Ms. Holland or Mr. Rhoads 
her keys, and did not see anyone driving her car. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.3-8.) 
Ms. Holland had previously driven the car with Ms. Kreisher's permission. (Trial 
Tr., p.140, Ls.8-15., p.153, L.24 p.154, L.·11, p.197, Ls.1-2.) 
Pictures of the vehicle's interior reflected that the driver's was positioned 
close to the steering wheel. (Defense Ex., C.) The pictures depicted the passenger's 
seat as pushed nearly as far back as it could go.3 (Defense Ex., C.) A pair of large 
shoes was located on the passenger-side floor. (Defense Ex., D.) A pair of sunglasses 
identified by Ms. Kreisher as belonging to Mr. Rhoads was located in the driver's side 
door compartment. (Trial Tr., p.135 Ls.11-25.) 
Ms. Holland initially told Deputies Miller and Hale that "Jeff" was driving and she 
was riding in the backseat when the accident happened.4 (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.8-10, 
p.300, Ls.3-4.) She told the nurse at her physician's appointment three days after the 
3 Mr. Rhoads is a tall man, approximately six feet tall. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.22 - p.315, 
L.2, 338, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland is a petite woman at approximately five feet, five inches, 
130 pounds. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.11-14, 337, Ls.24-25.) 
4 Although Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads initially claimed a person named "Jeff" was 
driving and that "Jeff" fled the scene, Ms. Holland later admitted that "Jeff" was a 
fictitious person. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.) 
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accident that she didn't remember anything at all from that day. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.11 
19.) In the same visit, she told her physician that the impact was in the front of the 
vehicle and that she was wearing a seatbelt. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 p.288, L.2.) Then 
she testified at Mr. Rhoads' preliminary hearing that she remembered nothing about the 
entire day. (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.7-22.) Ms. Holland said that she possibly was driving 
when they first left Ms. Kreisher's house, but she didn't remember. (Trial Tr., p.196, 
Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14.) At Mr. Rhoads' trial, Ms. Holland testified that she 
remembered only bits and pieces of that day. (Trial Tr. p.184, Ls.4-13.) She recalled 
looking for her cigarettes at one point, and at that time Mr. Rhoads was driving. (Trial 
Tr. p.184, L.14 p.185, L.8.) The 
the passenger door. 5 (Trial Tr., p.1 
thing she remembered was trying to crawl out of 
Ls.1-4.) 
Mr. Rhoads consistently maintained "Jeff" was driving the car. (Trial 
Tr., p.253, Ls.16-18, p.260, Ls.22-25, p.31 Ls.9-16.) Ms. Holland's varied 
each time she was questioned and/or testified.6 (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.4-13, 
p.195, Ls.7-22, p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14, p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.) 
Mr. Rhoads had one previous felony DUI conviction, from a 2006 case. (Trial 
Tr., p.442, Ls.23-25.) Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUI convictions, one in 
2009 and one in 2011. (PSI, p.3.) 
5 The driver's side door was not a valid method of exiting the vehicle, as it was up 
against the barbed wire fence and was hanging over the cliff. (State's Ex. 1.) 
6 For example, Ms. Holland also misrepresented the facts when asked where she lived 
(Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.6-16), when she lost her phone (Trial Tr., p.261, L.21 - p.262, L.3), 
and whether she smoked or drank alcohol (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.13). 
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Mr. Rhoads was charged by information with felony DUI, felony operating a 
vehicle without the owner's consent (hereinafter, joyriding), and failure to report an 
accident. (R., pp.40-41.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of Deputy Miller 
and Detective Hales of the Ada County Sheriff's Department. (Trial Tr., p.242, L.6 -
p.267, L.19, p.292, L.6 p.335, L.20) Deputy Miller was the first officer to arrive at the 
scene. She immediately placed the two individuals in the back of her car, as they were 
dressed inappropriately for the weather. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.22-23, p.247, Ls.9-11.) 
Deputy Miller then transported the individuals back to the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.246, 
Ls.9-15.) Ms. Holland complained of an injury to her knee. (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.14-23.) 
Holland and Mr. Rhoads sat in of Deputy Miller's car for approximately 40 
minutes, during which time they conversed,7 and even sang.8 (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23; 
State's Ex., *-008.) Deputy Miller's car video recorded the two's conversations and 
antics. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23; State's Ex., *-008.) 
Deputy Hales testified that he decided not to have the steering wheel of the car 
tested for finger prints. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.6-15.) Although he asked Mr. Rhoads 
whether his fingerprints would be on the steering wheel of the car and Mr. Rhoads 
responded that they might be, on cross-examination, Deputy Hales acknowledged that 
there are several other ways by which Mr. Rhoads' fingerprints could have gotten on the 
steering wheel other than by driving the car. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.16 - p.333, L.3.) 
7 Some part of their conversation involved reiterating that Jeff was the driver of the car 
and that he had left the scene. (State's Ex., *-008.) 
8 Mr. Rhoads was in a band, and presumably they were signing one of the songs his 
band performed. (Trial Tr., p.118, Ls.4-12; State's Ex., *-008.) 
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In addition to these officers, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Benjamin 
Cornett, who was an emergency room physician who Ms. Holland visited three days 
after the accident, purportedly regarding injuries she suffered in the accident.9 (Trial 
Tr., p.280, L.2 - p.281, L.21.) Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland reported that she 
was in a motor vehicle collision and hit her head. (Trial Tr., p.281, Ls.13-19.) 
Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland complained of a dull throbbing frontal headache 
and some nausea, and he determined that she likely had suffered a concussion. (Trial 
Tr., p.281, L.16-p.282, L.15.) 
Finally, the State presented the testimony of a witness who was traveling down 
Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland standing on the side of the 
road. (Trial Tr., p.336, L.24 - p.337, L.19.) Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads' 
attorney, the witness was permitted to testify that he heard Ms. Holland say to 
Mr. Rhoads, "You wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) The 
district court found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and, thus, fell within 
9 Dr. Garnett's diagnosis of a concussion was based on information Ms. Holland 
reported to him. (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.22-24, p.284, Ls.5-17.) A CT scan came back 
negative as did Dr. Garnett's tests of memory, reflexes, etc., thus there was no objective 
physical evidence to support Ms. Holland's complaints. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.25 - p.285, 
L.5.) Further, Ms. Holland told the nurse that she did not remember the accident or 
anything from that day and complained of a headache, shoulder pain and low back pain. 
(Trial Tr. p.285, Ls.11-19.) She told the nurse that the vehicle may have just gone off 
the side of the road. (Trial Tr., p.288, Ls.11-16.) However, at the same visit, she told 
Dr. Cornett many more details about the accident-that she was wearing a seat belt, 
that the driver lost control of the vehicle, that the impact was in the front of the vehicle, 
and that this was a single-vehicle accident which resulted in mild damage to the vehicle. 
(Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288, L.2.) Further, Ms. Holland offered additional inconsistent 
statements where she told the nurse that she did smoke but did not use alcohol, but told 
Dr. Cornett that she uses alcohol, but does not smoke. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, 
L.13.) 
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an exception to the prohibition against hearsay contained in the rules of evidence, 
I.R.E. 803(2). (Trial Tr., p.342, L.18 p.343, L.7.) 
After some discussion of whether Mr. Rhoads would testify, Mr. Rhoads advised 
the district court that he would not be testifying, and the defense rested without 
presenting any evidence. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.4-20, p.363, L.18-19.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Rhoads of felony DUI and felony joyriding. (Trial 
Tr., p.441, Ls.13-17; R., pp.158-161.) Mr. Rhoads was acquitted on the charge of 
misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. (Trial Tr., p.441, L.17.) 
At trial, Mr. Rhoads stipulated that this was his second felony DUI in ten years. 
(Trial Tr., p.442, L.23 - p.443, L.6.) 
The district court ordered a I, a mental health evaluation, and a substance 
abuse evaluation, it set the matter for a sentencing (Trial Tr., p.446, L.24 
p.27, L.5; 5/8/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25; R., p.153.) 
Mr. Rhoads was sentenced on March 8, 2012. (5/8/12 Tr., generally; R., p.33.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a sentence of ten years unified, with five 
years fixed, on the felony DUI and five years indeterminate for the felony joyriding 
conviction. (5/8/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-16.) Mr. Rhoads offered significant evidence in 
mitigation (PSI, pp.254-281) and, during his allocution, expressed considerable remorse 
for relapsing and for putting himself in the situation that he did (5/8/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.1-5). 
Mr. Rhoads was sentenced to 10 years, with four years fixed, for his conviction of felony 
DUI. (5/8/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.) For his conviction of felony joyriding, Mr. Rhoads 
received a sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (5/8/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-8.) Each 
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of these sentences was ordered to run concurrently. (5/8/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11; 
R., p.159.) 
Mr. Rhoads timely appealed from his judgment of conviction and sentences. 
(R., pp.164-166, 173-176.) On appeal, Mr. Rhoads asserted that the district court erred 
in allowing a witness to testify to a hearsay statement as an "excited utterance." 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, finding that it did 
not need to decide whether the statement was improperly admitted either as an excited 
utterance or as a prior consistent statement because any error was harmless. (Opinion, 
p.3.) The Court of Appeals found that the evidence at trial showed that the verdict 
rendered was unattributable to the alleged error. (Opinion, p.5.) The Court noted 
any error was harmless where a similar statement made by Holland in police 
car was admitted without objection, and Mr. Rhoads' response to the statement in 
car was "more condemning" than Ms. Holland's statement to the witness. 10 (Opinion, 
p.4.) The Court noted that Mr. Rhoads' sunglasses were found on the driver's side of 
the vehicle. 11 (Opinion, p.4.) The Court also noted that the defense's photos which 
were admitted at trial seemed to show that Mr. Rhoads did not drive; however, the Court 
discounted the import of the photos, finding that the photos were admitted without 
relevant foundation. (Opinion, pp.4-5.) 
Mr. Rhoads timely filed a Petition for Review. 
10 The statement challenged by Mr. Rhoads was "You wrecked [inaudible]'s car," but the 
statement the Court of Appeals determined to be almost identical was "you were the 
one f--ing driving." (Opinion, p.4; Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) Thus, even if we 
assume, arguendo, that he did drive the car, the critical inquiry was when Mr. Rhoads 
was driving the car, that is, whether he was driving while intoxicated. 
11 This seems only to show that at some point a person who was driving the car must 
have been wearing Mr. Rhoads' sunglasses. 
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ISSUE 
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Rhoads' Judgment of Conviction in 
conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court the United 
Supreme Court in that the decision improperly applies the harmless error standard? 
9 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Rhoads' Judgment of Conviction Is 
In Conflict With Applicable Decisions Of the Idaho Supreme Court And The United 
States Supreme Court In That The Decision Improperly Applied The Harmless Error 
Standard 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Rhoads submits that the Idaho Court of Appeals incorrectly found that the 
verdict rendered was unattributable to the alleged error. Mr. Rhoads further submits 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that his failure to deny the statement by 
Ms. Holland during the videotaped portion of time they were sitting in the back of the 
police car was 
witness. Further, a 
condemning" than the statement by Holland in front of the 
as to who wrecked the car and a 
Mr. drove the car are not "almost identical." The 
that 
challenged by 
Mr. Rhoads was "You wrecked [inaudible]'s car," but the statement the Court of Appeals 
determined to be almost identical was "you were the one f--ing driving." (Opinion, p.4; 
Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) Thus, even if we assume, arguendo, that he did 
drive the car, the critical inquiry was when Mr. Rhoads was driving the car, that is, 
whether he was driving while he was intoxicated. Because the Court's findings were not 
in accord with the evidence and with the correct legal standards, Mr. Rhoads submits 
that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the district court. 
Further, where the Court of Appeals found that the defense's photographic evidence 
was "admitted without relevant foundation," this is improper as it was clearly a finding as 
to the admissibility of the evidence, and such which would only be properly framed as 
an objection at trial. (Opinion, p.5.) 
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B. Standard For Granting Petitions For Review 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a 
final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons ... " Factors to 
be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of 
either the Idaho Supreme Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals. I.AR. 118(b )(3). 
Mr. Rhoads asserts that the Opinion in his case is contrary to opinions from both 
the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. In this case, the Court 
of Appeals erroneously concluded that a different statement admitted without objection 
was "almost identical" such any error in admitting the objected-to statement was 
harmless, and further found that evidence admitted at trial without objection lacked 
"relevant foundation," essentially discounting the impact of such evidence on the verdict. 
The Court of Appeals essentially looked to whether the strength of the remaining 
evidence presented by the State supported a guilty verdict. 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals analysis is in conflict with precedent from 
both the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court that define the 
nature of harmless error review, Mr. Rhoads' Petition for Review should be granted. 
C. The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Rhoads' Judgment of 
Conviction Is Contrary To Opinions From Both The Idaho Supreme Court And 
The United States Supreme Court In That The Decision Improperly Applied The 
Harmless Error Standard 
Mr. Rhoads asserts that this Court should grant his petition for review because 
the Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is contrary to opinions from both the 
11 
Idaho Supreme and the United Supreme Court with regard to the 
application of the harmless error standard. I.A.R. 118(b)(2), (3). 
The appropriate standard for determining whether an objected-to error was 
harmless was clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
222 (2010). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Perry, 
150 Idaho at 227. To meet that burden, the State must "prove[] 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 221 
(quoting Chapman, 386 U 
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that: 
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of 
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial 
later held to have been erroneous .... To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record. 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 ), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 ). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court 
"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely 
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
This Court recently clarified that the harmless error test is not one in which the 
strength of the State's evidence is weighed in a vacuum, or in which the appellate court 
believes that the defendant would have been found guilty in absence of the error. 
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State v. Joy, 1 Idaho 1, 11-12 (2013) (holding error in admitting evidence of prior 
misconduct was not harmless where case was based primarily on whose version of 
events the jury believed, even where there was other evidence on which the jury could 
have based its verdict). The Court in Joy, held that the Chapman harmless error test 
requires the reviewing court to determine whether, "the error [is] unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question as revealed in the 
record." Joy, 155 Idaho at 10 (quoting Yates, 500 U.S. at 403). 
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that Ms. Holland's assertion that 
Mr. Rhoads was driving the car did not conclusively establish that Mr. Rhoads was 
driving when he was intoxicated or whether he was driving at the time the car went off 
the road and hit the wire fence. Arguably, Mr. may have driven the car 
some point, but the more critical question is whether he drove the car while 
intoxicated. Thus, simply because a statement was later made by Ms. Holland in which 
she said that Mr. Rhoads was driving the car, such does not negate the impact of the 
district court's error in admitting the more contemporaneous testimony of a witness who 
overheard Ms. Holland say that in fact Mr. Rhoads wrecked the car so that the first 
statement is therefore harmless. Clearly, testimony that was closer in time to the 
accident and which purported to establish who was actually driving when the car went 
off the road could have swayed the jury on whether Mr. Rhoads drove the car while 
intoxicated. Further, while in the police car, Ms. Holland told different stories as to who 
was driving when the car went off the road and hit the fence. The jury could have found 
the lone comment, made prior to the additional reflective time in the police car 
sufficiently persuasive such that it found Mr. Rhoads guilty of felony DUI and felony 
13 
joyriding. This error was not "unimportant in relation to everything else the jury 
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." See Yates, 500 U at 
403. Thus, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was "surely 
unattributable" to the admission of the statement that was overheard by Mr. Guryan. 
The district court's error in admitting the evidence was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, See also, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
The Court also noted that the defense's photos, which were admitted at trial, 
seemed to show that Mr. Rhoads did not drive; however, the Court discounted the 
import of the photos, finding that the photos were admitted without relevant foundation. 
(Opinion, pp.4-5.) Specifically, it held: 
Finally, Rhoads heavily on photographs that was 
moved close to the steering wheel and that two large tennis were 
on the passenger floorboard. Yet, these photos were admitted without 
relevant foundation. The defense argued below that the photographs 
showed Rhoads did not drive; however, the State explained to the jury that 
there was nothing admitted at trial to show where these photos came from 
or if anything was altered after the night of the accident. 
(Opinion, p.5.) Yet, the prosecutor did not object to the admission of the three photos at 
trial, and the State did not argue that the photos were improperly admitted in its 
Respondent's Brief. (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.9-16.) The Court improperly found that the 
photographs were admitted without the relevant foundation, which was a finding as to 
the admissibility of the evidence; however, such a determination would only be proper 
as an objection at trial. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition 
for Review. 
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D. This Court Should Grant Mr. Rhoads' Petition For Review, And Vacate The 
Judgment Of Conviction 
Mr. Rhoads asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting Ms. Holland's hearsay statement through the testimony of a third party 
because the remark did not fall under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
During the testimony of Mr. Guryan, the State sought to introduce a statement 
allegedly made by Ms. Holland to Mr. Rhoads as they approached 
Mr. Guryan. Mr. Guryan overheard Ms. Holland say, "I can't believe you wrecked so-
and-so's car." Defense counsel objected (Trial Tr., p.355, 18-20), but the district 
court found that because Ms. Holland Mr. Rhoads were still covered in mud, the 
statement was "contemporaneous" with the accident (Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13). 
Under Idaho Rule of (1.R. ) 802, hearsay is inadmissible except as 
provided by the Rules of Evidence. The relevant hearsay exception is embodied in 
I.R. 803(2). Pursuant to 1.R.E. 803(2) a "statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition" may come in under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. I.RE. 803(2) (emphasis added). In order to fall within this exception, there must 
be a startling event which renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of 
the observer, and the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that 
even rather than the result of reflective thought. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4 ( 1986); 
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2004 ); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
In State v. Griffith, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted: 
15 
In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance, the 
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of 
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between 
event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the 
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was 
volunteered or made in response to a question. 
v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 362-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 
Whether admit a statement as an excited utterance is committed to the trial court's 
discretion, State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 (1989); Doe, 140 Idaho at 876, and 
that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 
877. 
In 
held 
under 
v. Burton, 115 Idaho 1154 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
district court did not err in excluding evidence 
"excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule 
defense counsel 
there was a five-
minute interval between the end of the declarant/defendant's fight with the victims and 
making the statements. Burton involved an altercation between the defendant, his son, 
and the victims at a bar, and the defendant had shot the two victims with a pistol. Id. at 
1155. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery. Id. When the State called 
the defendant's son as a witness at trial, he attempted to repeat to the jury a remark the 
defendant had made to him as they drove away from the bar. Id. The defendant's son 
attempted to say, "'I had to shoot them. They were going to rat-pack us. . . . I had to 
do it for you."' Id. However, the district court determined that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay. Id. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule "has two 
requirements. First there must be a startling event which renders inoperative the 
normal reflective thought processes of the observer. Second, the declarant's statement 
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must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the result of reflective 
thought." Id. at 1156. The appellate court stated that the district court found that the 
second requirement had not been met, noting that: (1) the statement was detached by 
time and distance from the events; and (2) the statement was self-
serving. Id. Therefore, the circumstances did not point to any '"special reliability"' that 
would entitle the defendant's statement to be admitted under I.RE. 803(2). Id. 
In State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the district court committed error in admitting the declarant/victim's remarks 
through the testimony of a police officer, because the remarks were not "excited 
utterances, there was a ten-minute interval between the end of declarant's 
fight with the defendant and making the statements. Hansen involved a confrontation 
between declarant and her boyfriend, and the deciarant reported to the police that 
the boyfriend pushed the declarant into her house, smashed furniture, repeatedly 
pushed the declarant onto the couch, and kicked items out of her hands. Id. at 
327. The boyfriend was charged with battery. Id. at 324. The Court noted that in 
determining whether a statement falls within the excited utterance exception: 
[t]he circumstances to be considered include the amount of time that 
elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the 
condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or 
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or 
made in response to a question. 
Id. at 325. In vacating the Judgment of Conviction and remanding the case for a new 
trial, the Court primarily reasoned that: (1) the ten minute gap between the conclusion 
of the delcarant's fight with the defendant and her arrival at the police station was 
sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication; (2) the declarant's anger with the 
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defendant could have provided an incentive to concoct or embellish her description of 
the confrontation to the police officer; (3) the statements were not an expletive or burst 
of words in abrupt response to a shocking event, but an extensive narration of the fight; 
and (4) the declarant was not a child, but rather an adult woman. Id. 326-27. 
Therefore, the statements did not carry the indicia of reliability envisioned by I.R. 
803(2). Id. at 326. 
Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads' attorney, witness Michael Guryan was 
permitted to testify that he overheard Ms. Holland say to Mr. Rhoads, "[y]ou know, you 
wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.24 - p.342, L.2.) Defense counsel 
objected to the ,an,te>rH coming in as an excited utterance because: (1) it was a 
statement by a potential co-defendant; (2) the statement was not contemporaneous 
to when the incident happened. (Trial Tr., p.355, L.17 p.356, L.4.) The district court 
found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and thus fell within an exception to 
the hearsay rules. (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.3-7.) The district court further explained its 
reasoning: 
And the Court will note that one of the things that I paid particular attention 
to is the fact that the parties were still muddy from coming up the hill, and 
that is one of the reasons that I made the determination that this had 
occurred, and the parties were still under the influence of the event. 
(Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13.) 
However, between the time of the accident and the time Mr. Guryan overheard 
Ms. Holland's statement about wrecking the car, Ms. Holland had climbed out of the car, 
perhaps made some attempts to free the car, scrambled up a muddy embankment, and 
began walking/staggering down the road. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.263, L.10, p.337, 
Ls.15-22, p.346, Ls.16-19, p.348, Ls.3-7.) Thus the statement was detached both by 
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time and by distance from the accident. Mr. Guryan, the witness who was traveling 
down Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland walking on the side of 
the road, testified that he did not initially see the car: 
In fact, what was odd was that there was no car to be seen when we came 
down the hill and around the corner. We just saw two people. 
(Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Guryan testified that he couldn't tell if they were arguing 
or struggling to hold each other up, and described it as a "weird dance." (Trial 
Tr., p.339, Ls.9-11, p.348, L.23.) Mr. Guryan said that the two individuals had one shoe 
between them-like they had lost some shoes trying to get up the embankment. (Trial 
Tr., p.348, ) Further, Mr. Guryan's description of the situation made it clear that 
he was not witnessing some sort of emergency--although the two individuals were 
missing some shoes ancJ were quite muddy, "popped back up and said, 'Oh, we 
are fine. Everything is good."' (Trial Tr., p.337, L.20 p.339, L.14.) 
Thus Ms. Holland's statement was sufficiently separated in both time and 
location from the accident such that it was not contemporaneous. 
Further, not only was Ms. Holland not excited or stressed about the situation, her 
statement was self-serving. See Burton, 115 Idaho at 1156. The district court failed to 
consider that the statement was made by one of only two people in the car who could 
have been driving. The statement by Ms. Holland was most decidedly self-serving. 
Ms. Holland, a minor under the age of 21, was certainly under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the accident, and, had she admitted to driving the car, it was very likely she 
would have then been charged with felony driving under the influence.12 A comment as 
12 As Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUls in the last ten years, she was facing 
felony charges if she was implicated as the driver of the vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) In fact, 
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to who was driving in front of the first witness they encountered was a self-serving 
statement by Ms. Holland and, therefore, should not fall under the 
hearsay exception. 
utterance" 
As Ms. Kreisher's car was found "on an edge of a cliff," held up only by a barbed 
wire fence (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.14-18, p.252, Ls.9-12), such qualified as a startling event 
which may have, for a period of time during and immediately following the accident, 
rendered inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of those inside the vehicle 
during the accident. However, Ms. Holland's statement was not a spontaneous reaction 
to the accident, but was the result of reflective thought. Here, like the statement in 
Ms. Holland had sufficient time after the 
fabrication. Notably, Ms. in 
reflective thought and 
story with Mr. Rhoads that 
identified a fictitious person named "Jeff" as the driver of the car. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls. 7-
1.} Since Ms. Holland had ample time to reflect and discuss the fabrication of a 
fictitious driver, accordingly she also had sufficient time to reflect on the accident such 
that the statement was clearly not an "excited utterance." The circumstances in this 
case do not indicate any "'special reliability"' about Ms. Holland's statement such that it 
would be admissible under 1.R.E. 803(2). 
Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the statement as an "excited 
utterance."13 
Ms. Holland could have still been charged with a felony DUI as of the date of her 
testimony at Mr. Rhoads' trial. (Trial Tr., p.266, Ls.1-7.) 
13 The State claims that this was not only an "excited utterance," but was alternatively 
admitted as a prior consistent statement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) Yet the State 
also concedes that the district court only admitted the statement as an "excited 
utterance." (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16, n.4.) In a recent decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 (2013), the Court explicitly held that "the 
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In setting forth the harmless error test, the State relied on the holding in State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669 (2010), in which the Court held: "The inquiry is whether, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence." (Respondent's Brief, p.19.) This is 
incorrect. The appropriate standard for determining whether an objected-to error was 
harmless was clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
222 (2010). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme 
150 Idaho at 227. To 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U . 18, 24 (1967). Perry, 
burden, the State must ] 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' " Id. at 221 
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that: 
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of 
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial 
later held to have been erroneous .... To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation 
Rule only permits introduction of out-of-court statements that were made prior to the 
time when the declarant would have a motive to lie." Joy, 304 P.3d at 289 (finding that 
victim had motivation for lying prior to her testimony at the preliminary hearing as parties 
were divorcing, thus the evidence was not proper under Rule 801 (d)(1 )(8) because the 
preliminary hearing testimony did not precede her motive to lie). Here we are faced with 
a situation where both individuals were seriously intoxicated, and had just gotten a car 
stuck in the mud. Even in such an intoxicated state, Ms. Holland would have been well 
aware that she would be facing criminal prosecution for felony DUI should she admit 
that she was driving the car. As noted in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Holland had two 
prior misdemeanor DUls in the last ten years, thus she was facing felony charges if she 
was implicated as the driver of the vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) Thus Ms. Holland undoubtedly 
had a motive to lie after the accident, while in the presence of Mr. Guryan. 
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to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record. 
V. 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 ). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court 
"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely 
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
The error was objected to, thus it became the State's burden to prove that the 
admission of the evidence did not contribute to the conviction. Although the State 
claimed that the evidence of Mr. Rhoads' guilt was "overwhelming," this is not the 
correct to determine whether the error was harmless and is factually incorrect 
based on the facts adduced at trial in this case. The testimony at trial made it entirely 
unclear as to who was driving the car at the time of the accident. 14 Ms. Kreisher 
testified that she did not see either Ms. Holland or Mr. Rhoads take her keys, and did 
not see anyone driving her car. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.3-8.) Ms. Holland had previously 
driven the car with Ms. Kreisher's permission. (Trial Tr., p.140, Ls.8-15., p.153, L.24 -
p.154, L.11, p.197, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland initially told Deputies Miller and Hale that "Jeff' 
was driving and she was riding in the backseat when the accident happened. 15 (Trial 
Tr., p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.) She told the nurse at her physician's appointment 
three days after the accident that she didn't remember anything at all from that day. 
14 The car was missing for approximately four hours before Officer Miller made contact 
with Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads. (Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.17-21, p.125, Ls.13-25, p.245, 
Ls.2-16; State's Ex., *-008.) It is not unreasonable to assume that each of them drove 
the car at some point during the four hours. 
15 Although Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads initially claimed a person named "Jeff" was 
driving and that "Jeff' fled the scene, Ms. Holland later admitted that "Jeff" was a 
fictitious person. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.) 
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(Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.11-19.) In the same visit, she told her physician that the impact 
was in the front of the vehicle and that she was wearing a seatbelt. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 
p.288, L.2.) Then she told the jury that when she testified at Mr. Rhoads' preliminary 
hearing, she said that she remembered nothing about the entire day. (Trial Tr., p.195, 
7-22.) Ms. Holland said that she possibly was driving when they first left 
Ms. Kreisher's house, but she didn't remember. (Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, 
Ls.10-14.) At Mr. Rhoads' trial, Ms. Holland testified that she remembered only bits and 
pieces of that day. (Trial Tr. p.184, Ls.4-13.) She recalled looking for her cigarettes at 
one point, and at that time Mr. Rhoads was driving. (Trial Tr. p.184, L.14 p.185, L.B.) 
next thing she remembered was trying to crawl out of the 16 (Trial 
, p.186, Ls.1-4.) 
Mr. Rhoads consistently maintained that "Jeff" was driving the car at the time of 
the accident. (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.16-18, p.260, Ls.22-25, p.312, Ls.9-16.) 
Ms. Holland's stories varied each time she was questioned and/or testified. 17 (PSI, p.2; 
Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.4-13, p.195, Ls.7-22, p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14, p.253, Ls.8-
10, p.300, Ls.3-4.) 
Finally, the physical evidence at trial was such that pictures of the vehicle's 
interior after the accident reflected that the driver's seat was positioned close to the 
steering wheel. (Defense Ex., C.) The pictures depicted the passenger's seat as 
16 The driver's side door was not a valid method of exiting the vehicle, as it was up 
a.painst the barbed wire fence and was hanging over the cliff. (State's Ex. 1.) 
1 For example, Ms. Holland also misrepresented the facts when asked where she lived 
(Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.6-16), when she lost her phone (Trial Tr., p.261, L.21 - p.262, L.3), 
and whether she smoked or drank alcohol (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.13). 
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pushed nearly as far back as it could go.18 (Defense , C.) A pair of large shoes was 
on the passenger-side floor. (Defense Ex., 0.) A pair of sunglasses identified 
by Ms. Kreisher as belonging to Mr. Rhoads was located in the driver's side door 
compartment. (Trial Tr., p.135 Ls.11-25.) The steering wheel of the car was never 
tested for finger prints. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.6-15.) Although Mr. Rhoads was asked at 
the scene whether his fingerprints would be on the steering wheel of the car and 
Mr. Rhoads responded that they might be, on cross-examination, Deputy Hales 
acknowledged that there are several other ways by which Mr. Rhoads' fingerprints could 
have gotten on the steering wheel other than by driving the car. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.16 
p.333, L.3.) 
In sum, the testimony presented at trial did not conclusively establish who was 
driving the car at the time of the accident as demonstrated by the fact that the jury 
deliberated for over six hours before reaching a verdict. (R., pp.98-99.) Ms. Holland 
was not a credible witness as she had changed her story several times. The physical 
evidence at the scene was inconclusive-some items appeared to indicate that 
Ms. Holland was driving at the time of the accident, while some made it seem as if 
Mr. Rhoads was driving. A statement as to who wrecked the car, such as the one by 
Mr. Guyran that was admitted over the objections of defense counsel, was not harmless 
and almost certainly contributed to the jury's verdict. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals discussed some of the physical evidence in the 
record and ultimately concluded that it need not determine whether the statement was 
18 Mr. Rhoads is a tall man, approximately six feet tall. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.22 - p.315, 
L.2, 338, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland is a petite woman at approximately five feet, five inches, 
and 130 pounds. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.11-14, 337, Ls.24-25.) 
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improperly admitted, as any error was harmless. (Opinion, pp.3-5.) However, the Court 
of Appeals' Opinion is erroneous because it makes its own evidentiary determination-
that the defense's photos of the car that were admitted into evidence trial without 
objection were "admitted without relevant foundation." (Opinion, p.5.) For the Court of 
Appeals to discount evidence because of a purported lack of foundation when such was 
never objected to at trial, such is a clear departure from established precedent and the 
parameters of its standard of review. 
Further, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the 
Court of Appeals because the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the fact 
that Mr. didn't deny or an accusation regarding who drove car was 
even "more condemning" than admission of the overheard statement by Ms. Holland 
regarding who wrecked the car. (Opinion, p.4.) However, this conclusion appears to be 
baseless, as it is apparent that the Court did not consider any alternatives, including that 
Mr. Rhoads simply did not hear Ms. Holland's comment. Further, there was no 
testimony or evidence before either the trial court or the Court of Appeals that indicated 
that the fact that Mr. Rhoads did not vehemently deny the truth of Ms. Holland's 
statement somehow means that he therefore endorsed it or agreed with it, thus the 
Court's conclusion is based on nothing aside from mere speculation. Mr. Rhoads 
respectfully requests that this Court grant review and vacate the trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rhoads respectfully that his Petition Review be and that 
this Court the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court 
for a new trial. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2014. 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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